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Abstract 
 
In this text, I connect the concept of existence worked out by Heidegger with 
the concepts of radical understanding. Under this concept I mean the idea 
that existence is the radical (that is, minimal, unavoidable) content of every 
understanding. The fact that according to Heidegger existence is 
understanding is then explained through their common structure: existence is 
possibility as well as understanding is directed prominently to possibility. 
But, as it is shown through wider references to ancient as well as to some 
contemporary discussions, possibility introduces in the structure of existence 
a certain incommensurability: that is why existence can never be reduced to a 
positive, actual reality, but is always “something more” than actuality. 
 
Keywords: understanding, existence, possibility, hermeneutics, 
incommensurability 
 
 
 
1. Understanding, Existence, Possibility 
 
In Being and Time, Heidegger characterizes the understanding 
as a form of knowledge that is addressed to possibilities: “Why 
does understanding always penetrates into possibilities 
according to all the essential dimensions of what can be 
disclosed to it?” (Heidegger 2010, 136). According to Heidegger, 
this peculiarity of the understanding – which never remains at 
what is immediately given, but always goes beyond this 
immediacy – testifies its constitutive link with existence: the 
answer to the previous question is in fact that “the 
understanding in itself has the existential structure which we 
call project” (Heidegger 2010, 136). If understanding grasps 
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possibilities, this is due to the fact that existence, as the root of 
understanding itself, is in its turn possibility.  
In this essay, I will try to justify this very fundamental 
theorem of Heideggerian existential analysis from two points of 
view: the former is properly hermeneutical, since it concerns 
the process itself of understanding, its nuclear content, in the 
phenomenon of what I call “radical understanding”; the latter is 
more ontological, and concerns the radical structure of the 
existence, as it anyway emerges still in the phenomenon of 
radical understanding. The goal of this analysis is to uphold the 
central role that possibility has in Heidegger’s ontology as a 
common root, I would say, of both existence and understanding. 
In my theoretical approach to this question this claim is a 
further confirmation of the idea, which I developed in a more 
detailed way in other writings1, that the dynamical ontology of 
philosophical hermeneutics is a far consequence of Plato’s 
revision of the Parmenidean ontology, as a result of the 
discussion about the discovery of the incommensurable 
magnitudes in the Ancient Greece.2    
 
2. Non-Understandability and Existence 
 
We start with a purely hermeneutical problem. In the tradition 
of hermeneutics it has been always stressed that the starting 
point of every hermeneutical phenomenon is a certain negative 
experience: an experience of misunderstanding or, furthermore, 
of non-understanding. Hermeneutics practice begins indeed in 
presence of loci obscuri, which prevent or obstruct the 
understanding, and require an interpretative work, through 
which we try to restore, reconstruct or better understand the 
meaning of a speech or of a text. In these cases, we are anyway 
provided with a semantic horizon – other sentences of the text – 
which furnishes a guiding line of the requested interpretation.   
But let’s imagine a more radical situation, in which absolutely 
nothing is understandable and no meaning accessible. We can 
imagine, for instance, to be in face of a product of an alien 
intelligence, whose language, culture, writing, is for us 
completely unknown.3 So far as it can appear like science 
fiction, such a situation is in reality more terrestrial than we 
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think. It is, indeed, what normally happens when we deal with 
vanished civilizations, that is, with signs that attest to 
something, although nobody knows exactly what. This situation 
would therefore be far more difficult than the situation of the 
ethnologist who, in Quine’s famous example, meets with a 
native, with whose civilization nobody ever had any contact 
before (Quine 1960; Quine 1969). It would be more difficult 
because she could not interact with her interlocutor in order to 
find in his behavior the confirmation or the non-confirmation of 
her suppositions; she could not rely, consequently, on any 
‘stimulus meaning’ in order to reconstruct the native’s 
language.  
Hieroglyphics – a writing for a long time completely 
unknown and object of many speculations – was deciphered 
only after the discovery of the Rosetta Stone, that is when other 
well-known writings have taken the place of the native 
interlocutor. In our radical example, however, we are dealing 
with a writing for which there is, and presumably can be, no 
translation. Nonetheless, even undeciphered, hieroglyphs were 
for us legitimately a writing, just like other writings, not 
deciphered yet, as for instance the Olmec or the Rongorongo: in 
them, we do not simply see sensible data (blobs of colors, 
scratches, incisions), but rather symbols, however meaningless. 
We can then conclude that a non-understandable writing is 
eventually understood at least as writing: this is the central 
idea of what I call ‘radical understanding.’  This expression 
recalls evidently Quine’s ‘radical translation’ and Davidson’s 
‘radical interpretation’ (Davidson 2001), with which it has in 
common the same attempt to go to the roots, so to say, of 
translation, interpretation or understanding. It denotes a 
radical situation of understanding or an extreme case of 
indecipherability, in which a necessary presupposition of every 
understanding emerges. By fact, what we implicitly understand 
in this case is the condition of possibility of the writing, that is 
its relation, not to objects or to a world, but to a ‘subject,’ to an 
intelligence that produced it. Writing tells us in this case 
nothing about objects or a world, but only shows itself as a 
product of an intelligence. The feature of a non-understandable 
writing, then, is the fact that it can operate a sort of epoché, 
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reducing this way its message to a pure formal content, we can 
eventually say, to its transcendental form, to its condition of 
possibility. By showing itself as the product of an intelligence, 
writing shows that somewhere an intelligence exists or has 
existed. What an alien or a vanished culture still communicate 
to us (and this is the deepest experience of the historian), what 
they give us to understand through their remnants or their 
incomprehensible writings, then, is the fact that someone is or 
were there. This is the minimal or radical content of every 
understanding. 
 
3. Text and Ontology 
 
Twentieth-century hermeneutics has brought to light this 
minimal or radical content of understanding, following a path 
where the methodological question about the possibility of 
understanding becomes, for internal and transcendental 
reasons, the question about the ontological conditions of the 
possibility of sense. The Heideggerian interest in the formal 
conditions of understanding is similar to Kant’s investigation 
about knowledge: but whereas Kant asks about the conditions 
of possibility of knowledge, Heidegger asks about the conditions 
of possibility of sense. The main question of Being and Time, 
“which is the sense of Being in general?”, implies, indeed, the 
question “which is the condition of possibility of sense in 
general?”. And whereas Kant finds the requested condition of 
possibility of knowledge in the transcendental subject, 
Heidegger finds the condition of possibility of sense in the 
Dasein, as that being in which the possibility of understanding, 
that is, of sense lies. This structure allows speaking of Being 
and Time as a ‘critique of the hermeneutical reason,’ inasmuch 
it pursue a project formally similar to that of the Kantian First 
Critique. 
Methodologically, the way Heidegger operates in this 
project shows another difference in comparison to Kant: it is in 
fact more similar to the Husserlian phenomenological method, 
or to the Cartesian method of doubt. Indeed, it implies an 
epoché (phenomenologically represented by anxiety – Heidegger 
2010, § 40) of every meaning, the goal of which is to let emerge 
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(in a literal meaning of the word ‘e-vidence’), what still remains 
understandable, when nothing else is understandable, that is, 
when every determinate meaning disappears. It is therefore 
possible to establish an analogy between the existential 
analysis and the several grades of the text’s decipherability: the 
passage from inauthentic to authentic existence can be read as 
a passage from the semantic (radical interpretation) or 
syntactic (radical translation) level to the ontological one 
(radical understanding). 
By understanding a text, it is a question at a first level, 
of understanding what the text says, i.e. of making its 
meanings explicit; this level  corresponds to the inauthentic 
existence, in which, as Heidegger says, Dasein is by the world, 
by the objects as ‘meanings’ of its intentional behaviors. 
Interpretation still moves in this case in an obvious and 
everyday understanding of the text, supported by a shared 
background of common sense. Interpretation in this case aims 
as much as possible at the optimization of the agreement 
between the interlocutors, or between the text and the reader, 
involving their whole respective linguistic system (their 
common syntax and semantic), their beliefs and the 
presupposed ontology (a task pursued by Quine’s radical 
translation and Davidson’s radical interpretation). 
The phenomenon of anxiety opens, according to 
Heidegger, another form of understanding, in which all the 
semantic and syntactic assurances of the world disappear, and 
every meaning is suspended or bracketed. “Nothing of that 
which is at hand and objectively present within the world, 
functions as what Angst is anxious about. The totality of 
relevance discovered within the world of things at hand and 
objectively present is completely without importance. It 
collapses. The world has the character of complete 
insignificance. In Angst we do not encounter this or that thing 
which, as threatening, could be relevant” (Heidegger 2010, 174). 
At the level of the text, this corresponds to the experience of a 
total indecipherability, which lets a text appear as such, as 
something potentially understandable. What ‘remains’ in this 
case is the very condition of the possibility of sense, that is the 
existence. We can therefore say that understanding, in its 
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minimal, radical, degree, consists of understanding an 
existence. Even in the most complete senselessness – the case of 
an indecipherable text, of an unknown language, even the case 
of the rambling speech such as the speech of the delirium or of 
the madness – a minimum of understanding is nonetheless 
always involved, given the fact that we are dealing with a 
writing or a speech that refers to an existence. I define this 
level ontological or of radical understanding: at the bottom of 
every semantic and every syntax – and thus of every possibility 
of sense – there is the existence. It emphasizes the fact that in 
every understanding there is an ineradicable moment, an 
understood – the existence – that cannot not be understood by 
an intelligent being (it must be able to accompany every 
understanding4). 
We can consider Heidegger’s ontological turn in the 
history of hermeneutics as a recognition that the formal 
condition of the possibility of understanding is at the same time 
the minimum, radical content of every understanding, or, in 
other words, as nothing but the explication of the deep sense of 
the Cartesian cogito ergo sum and of the Kantian 
transcendental deduction. According to Heidegger, Descartes, 
in its ‘radical’ beginning” of giving philosophy “a new and 
secure foundation”, left undermined “the manner of being of the 
res cogitans, more precisely, the meaning of being of the ‘sum’” 
(Heidegger 2010, 21). ‘Radical understanding’ lets emerge this 
meaning of the sum, which cannot anymore be conceived as a 
substance, as a res, but as something instable and contingent. 
Notwithstanding some formal analogies in the method, 
as we suggested in the previous paragraph, this operation 
pushes hermeneutics beyond every phenomenology: in fact, if 
phenomenology begins with an epoché of the existence, in order 
to retain only the essences, hermeneutics infringes 
systematically this phenomenological closure. Its very ‘object’ is 
not the essence, the eidos, resulting from an epoché of existence, 
but just the existence. The hermeneutical approach to the 
ontological problem of the sense of Being appears like the 
‘negative’ of the phenomenological approach to knowledge: it is 
not a matter of extracting the essences, in their giveness or 
actuality, from our experience, but of letting emerge the 
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existence in its facticity, which, for Heidegger, means its 
possibility; or, better, as possibility. 
The radical understanding does not rest at perception, 
for which a non-understandable writing appears merely as a 
material thing, as a stone, a paper, a set of colors; in the radical 
understanding, we are instead pushed beyond the phenomenon 
to its condition of possibility, that is to an existence. From a 
phenomenological point of view, existence is the actuality of the 
phenomenon in perception; for hermeneutics, existence is given 
– that is: understood – as possibility. If existence were the mere 
presence of the object to perception, there would be no 
possibility to infer the existence of a Dasein as a condition of 
possibility of writing. That is: there would be no writing at all, 
but only perception; no meanings, but only sensible data; no 
world, but only facts, no time or history, but only presence. The 
most general approach to existence, then, is not perception, but 
understanding, and just because understanding has the 
capability to transcend the mere presence and to grasp the 
existence in its possibility; even more: as possibility, as 
something that is, but that can also disappear, that can not-be. 
I call then “radical understanding” the understanding of an 
existence as condition of possibility of the sense in general, 
when the sense itself disappears and even the existence is 
understood as a mere possibility, as that condition, which is no 
longer there. The result of this understanding is the 
comprehension of existence in a dynamic, that is, temporal way. 
 
4. The Homeomorphism between Understanding and 
Existence 
 
By considering the phenomenon not as full presence but as a 
trace, not as a speech but as a writing – in other words: as 
always undermined by a difference, by a reference to something 
other, to an absence5 –, hermeneutics entails then a completely 
different understanding of existence. As object of perception, 
existence would be a mere presence, an actuality, a simple fact; 
as object of understanding, existence implies on the contrary a 
reference to an absence, to a ‘lack’, or, to see it from another 
point of view, to something ‘more’ than the mere presence or 
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facticity. It is in this sense that Dasein, according to Heidegger, 
is “constantly ‘more’ than it actually is” (Heidegger 2010, 136). 
This ‘more’ – which from the point of view of the mere presence, 
of what is ‘ready-to-hand’, appears as a lack – constitutes it as 
possibility. Dasein is always “ahead of itself,” it cannot quiet in 
any final actuality. “As projecting, understanding is the mode of 
being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities” 
(Heidegger 2010, 136). 
Understanding and existence have then the same 
structure. Indeed, understanding involves a relation to 
something absent, which is not immediately given, be it the 
object or, as it is particularly clear in the radical 
understanding, the subject (an existence). Likewise, existence is 
structurally incomplete, it is always more than its facticity, 
‘ahead of itself’. We could then say that topologically 
understanding and existence are homeomorphic and that their 
homeomorphism lies in their common structure, that of the 
possibility.  
We can first highlight the homeomorphism between 
understanding and existence following some considerations 
developed in two books, which deal with this subject: Unquiet 
Understanding (2006) by Nicholas Davey, and The Life of 
Understanding (2012) by James Risser. 
Nicholas Davey emphasizes instability as the essential 
feature of understanding: “Understanding is inherently 
unstable,” (Davey 2006, 184) that is, intrinsically dynamic; it is 
a continuous transformative process that cannot conclude in a 
static form. As such, it has truly neither initial nor conclusive 
moment, but ‘lives’ in the ‘in-betweeness’ that characterizes 
every process really alive and dynamic. This also means that 
understanding can never reach any wholeness and 
completeness. It strives neither to the one nor to the other, 
since both would mark its end: “If the life of understanding 
depends upon continuous movement, then unlike reason, 
understanding does not seek wholeness or completeness. […] 
For understanding to aspire to wholeness and completeness, 
would be for understanding to seek its end” (Davey 2006, 184)6.  
Nicholas Davey finds the reason of this incompleteness of 
understanding in what he calls the ‘principle of 
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incommensurability’: “The deployment of hermeneutical excess 
within speculative reasoning establishes a principle of 
incommensurability which explains why the movement of 
understanding is both never ending and self-perpetuating” 
(Davey 2006, 14). This principle, in which Davey summarizes 
the logic of hermeneutics, can formally be expressed this way: 
“x = x+” (Davey 2006, 5-6 and 15). It means that this logic 
involves an excess, an irreducible unequivalence, a differential, 
which can be found both in the product and in the source. It 
justifies therefore both a “creative optimism,” since it means 
that there is always something new to do and to say, and an 
“interpretative modesty,” since every creation or interpretation 
does not exhaust the potentiality of the subject-matter (Davey 
2006, 14). Another different interpretation can always arise. 
This logic tries to grasp the continuous process of 
transformation of understanding, a process that eventually 
mirrors the intimate logic of life. The link between 
understanding and life, which in this context is equivalent to 
existence,  is clear in many expressions, which cover the whole 
text of Nicholas Davey: “living movement of understanding,” 
“vitality of understanding,” or, as in the just quoted claim, “life 
of understanding.” This last expression coincides with the title 
of James Risser’s book, signalizing the consonance between 
these theoretical proposals. 
Risser concentrates on the bound between 
understanding and life, an image of which he finds in Plato’s 
metaphor of weaving given in the Statesman: understanding is 
“intimately tied to what is being comprehended – a 
comprehending woven together with life” (Risser 2012, 60-61). 
To exemplify this weaving, Plato makes use of the ‘paradigm of 
the paradigms,’ that of the grammar: the elements (stoicheia) of 
the language join to form words and sentences, giving rise to 
the discourse, which is something alive, in movement. The 
weaving, then, must not be understood, as Risser explains, as a 
mere ‘collection,’ that is as a juxtaposition of elements, which 
remain extraneous to each other. It is rather a generative and 
transformative process, a ‘fabric of life’ by virtue of that 
dialectic logic which composes ‘identity and difference’: “Here 
the art of weaving pertains not simply to the art of combining 
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and separating words, but to the language formation as such, to 
what occurs as the generative function of language that mirrors 
the ‘becoming of being’” (Risser 2012, 65-66). 
Risser remarks rightly that the ‘becoming of being’ has 
to be understood in the light of that incremental process, which 
Gadamer denotes with the expression ‘increase in being’ 
(Zuwachs an Sein), and which for Plato is the third way limit 
and unlimit compose themselves in the so called ‘third’ or 
‘mixed genus’ (Phil. 27b). Life growths on itself, it becomes 
constantly more than it was, it explicates this way its 
potentiality. The analogy with the language can eventually 
clarify this important point: what is generated by the 
composition of the elements in the discourse is something ‘more’ 
in the sense that it involves the passage to another level of 
Being, to another dimension. The new, so generated reality 
implies a transformation, a new configuration. Appropriately, 
the increase is to be understood in the sense of the Hegelian 
concept of ‘concreteness,’ with which has without doubt also an 
etymological link. As the word ‘concrete,’ indeed, the word 
‘increase’ refers to the Latin word ‘crescere,’ ‘to grow,’ a typical 
phenomenon of life, which transforms itself by growing on and 
in itself, by generating synthetically a new reality, something 
more and different from the previous one. 
 
5. The Principle of Asymmetry 
 
The incremental difference is not simply quantitative nor 
simply qualitative. It is not simply quantitative, since it is not 
the mere addition of a homogeneous reality to the previous one, 
as in the serial enumeration of similar entities: it is not, in 
brief, a plurality. But it is neither a mere qualitative difference, 
since it does not involve the permanence of a substance, of 
which only the accidental determinations vary, as in the case of 
Descartes’ piece of wax, which remains ‘the same’ even if it is 
liquefied and changes completely its exterior aspect. The 
incremental difference is first of all a modal difference, in the 
sense that it involves also a dimensional transformation, from 
not-being to being, from the possible to the actual. Since it is 
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always also a possibility, Dasein is, as we have already said, 
“constantly ‘more’ than it actually is” (Heidegger 2010, 136). 
James Risser grasps this aspect (the idea, namely, that 
here a modal difference is at stake), when he understands the 
meaning of the weaving on the basis of a generative force that 
objectifies itself in the language: “To be more precise, what is 
peculiar to the weaving of discourse in which two dissimilar 
things are brought together is a combining involving a force or 
power (dynamis) that binds the elements, as in the spinning 
that interlaces the warp and woof” (Risser 2012, 67). This force, 
Risser adds, is the force of intelligibility, that is of 
understanding. 
This clarification allows us to see the generative – that 
is radical – moment of the language (and, correspondently, of 
life or existence) in the dynamis. Indeed, life itself is possibility, 
dynamis. What makes understanding the adequate cognitive 
form of life and existence, then, is the fact that it is far both 
from the static nature of the intellect and from the tendency to 
wholeness and completeness of the speculative reason, as they 
are conceived for instance by Hegel. Understanding is, on the 
contrary, at the same time dynamical (like the dialectic reason, 
Vernunft, which intertwines identity and difference) and 
inevitably incomplete (like the intellect, Verstand). This is a 
peculiarity of the hermeneutical logos, which makes it similar 
to the Aristotelian practical reason, that is to that form of 
rationality that is finite but, at the same time, always open to 
new possibilities. This new way to conceive rationality – at the 
same time dynamical, creative, and vital – is in my opinion the 
very challenge that philosophical hermeneutics, and with it all 
the human sciences, throw down to the contemporary world. 
We can at this point reconsider the formula Nicholas 
Davey used to summarize the logic of understanding as a very 
logic of life or of the existence. It does not mean, first of all, a 
chronological non-equivalence, as that between the possible (x) 
and its actualization (x+), or, on the contrary, between 
interpretation, as actualization of understanding (x), and the 
still inexhaustible possibility of the text (x+). It must be 
understood, in my opinion, just as an immanent relation, a 
movement of auto-transcendence (similar to what Dorthe 
Gaetano Chiurazzi / Possibility and Radical Understanding 
 
 
711 
 
Jørgensen denotes with the expression ‘immanent 
transcendence’) (see Jørgensen 2011 and 2015). This formula 
says that inside (=) the life (x) an ongoing process of auto-
increase (x+) is achieved7: understanding is the increase that 
leads life to be ‘more than itself,’ as well as this movement is 
possible just because life is constantly ‘more than its 
actualizations.’ This formula, which Davey calls ‘principle of 
incommensurability,’ but which we could likewise call ‘principle 
of asymmetry,’ expresses then the very structure of existence, 
which cannot be conceived neither as pure possibility nor as 
pure actuality: ‘x = x+’ says the internal asymmetry of life, the 
differential trait that makes it at the same time actual and 
possible, that is, mobile. 
We must remember at this point – making maybe a little 
clearer what I suggested at the beginning of this text, speaking 
about the link between the dynamical ontology of philosophical 
hermeneutics and the Platonic discussions on the 
incommensurable magnitudes – that asymmetron was an 
alternative word, beside alogon, that Greeks used to designate 
the incommensurable magnitudes: it is certainly more 
appropriate, since it means literally ‘non-commensurable’ and 
not ‘non-rational’: using it can then be recommended in order to 
emphasize that this logic is not a logic of commensurability, 
what does not mean that it is ‘irrational.’ The word ‘irrational’ 
is a remnant of the Pytagorean conception of logos (a ratio 
between integer numbers), which the incommensurable 
magnitudes have just refuted. The acceptance of these 
magnitudes in the realm of the logos involved the elaboration of 
a new ontology, an ontology in which the dynamis – and 
consequently all the modal aspect of reality – plays finally a 
fundamental role (Perillé 2002). 
The deep sense of ‘radical understanding’ lies in 
conclusion in this constitutive dynamism, both of the 
hermeneutical reason and of the existence. Contrary to the 
Hegelian reason, however, understanding does not tend to any 
wholeness and definitive completeness: because of its intrinsic 
dynamism, it cannot but remain incomplete and not total. 
Incompleteness and non-wholeness mean, not so much that 
there is something else outside this reality, but that it has 
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always still to be something other, it has still the possibility to 
transform itself. The expression ‘radical understanding’ 
summarizes then several aspects, which can be recapped this 
way: 
a) a transcendental aspect: radical understanding is a limit and 
a methodological situation, which lets the condition of 
possibility of every understanding emerge; 
b) an ontological aspect: this formal condition of possibility 
coincides with its ontological condition, that is with existence; 
c) a modal aspect: as condition of possibility of every 
understanding, existence appears itself as a possibility and not 
as an actuality. Even necessary for every understanding, it 
appears as inevitably contingent, as what disappears and can 
always disappear. The undecipherable text is the eminent trace 
of the disappeared existence. This point prevents radical 
understanding from being confused with some ontological proof: 
the necessary ‘material condition’ of understanding is not a 
necessary, but a possible being. The metaphysical tradition 
conceived of existence as a positive presence in the intuition or 
perception. Philosophical hermeneutics, on the contrary, 
conceives of existence as something mobile, which therefore 
requires a new more appropriate form of rationality, 
represented by understanding: a non-positive rationality, able 
to transcend the datum towards the non-datum, to see in every 
actuality a past or a new possibility, to intertwine identity and 
difference, reproducing this way in the discourse the ‘fabric of 
life’. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 For further explanations I can address the reader to some of my recent 
writings, such as: Chiurazzi 2013, 2015a and 2015b. 
2 This thesis comes from the fact that the incommensurable magnitudes were 
called in the Ancient Greek mathematics dynameis, since they were 
‘potentially’ rationalizable if raised to the square, as it is attested in a famous 
passage of Plato’s Theaetetus (Theaet. 148b). On this meaning see Vitrac 2008. 
3 I sum up some ideas exposed in an already published article: Chiurazzi 
2009. 
4 A reformulation of the famous incipit of §16 in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason (Kant 1965). 
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5 I refer here clearly to Derrida 1973. Husserl comes to this conception of the 
phenomenon in his Lectures on the passive synthesis, but it concerns only the 
object of perception as transcendent, that is, as existent before, then, every 
epoché. When the object is completely immanent to perception, no difference is 
possible, and the phenomenological existence coincides completely with the 
essence: esse est percipi. 
6 Davey highlights this feature of Gadamer’s conception of understanding in 
comparison to Dilthey: “Where Dilthey laments the inconclusiveness of 
understanding, Gadamer celebrates it” (Davey 2006, 1). 
7 There are many reasons to compare this claim to McDowell’s claim 
regarding the relation between the second and the first nature: the second 
nature is not something separate, as in the ‘rampant platonism’, but an 
internal increase of the first nature (see McDowell 1994). We are then 
‘naturally cultural’. The similarities of this claim with Gadamer’s philosophy 
do not require to be stressed: it is McDowell himself who recognizes this link 
in the Lecture VI of Mind and World. 
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